In a seminal statement, Emile Durkheim argued that punishment of crime has a salutary effect on society by reaffirming the collective consciousness. With few exceptions, Durkheim assumed that criminal punishment is done on behalf of society.
DURKHEIM, PUNISHMENT, AND PRISON PRIVATIZATION
Much recent sociological research on punishment owes a debt to Emile Durkheim. As David Garland recently wrote, "Punishment and society scholarship takes as its analytic starting point Emile Durkheim's theory of punishment and social solidarity" (Garland 2013:23) . This paper takes up some of Durkheim's central claims about crime and punishment, first laid out in Division of Labor in Society (Durkheim [1893 (Durkheim [ ] 1997 , and considers them in light of modern-day privatization of punishment.
Durkheim's major claim, as elaborated in Division, is that criminal punishment is functional for a society. While crime immediately degrades and attacks society's shared beliefs, the subsequent act of punishing a crime revivifies society by reaffirming shared moral understandings of right and wrong. By dramatizing the violation, punishment firms up the bounds between the acceptable behaviors of upstanding citizens and the intolerable behaviors of criminals.
While Durkheim wrote at length on criminal punishment, he gave little attention to the identity of the entity administering punishment. Governments increasingly contract with private organizations-often operating for private profit-to carry out statemandated criminal punishment. Such an arrangement raises a number of questions regarding the relationship between criminal punishment and social solidarity. What happens when ritualized ceremonies of punishment are carried out by non-state actors?
What happens when punishers are motivated by private profit instead of (or perhaps in addition to) the health of society as a whole? What happens when punishment looks less like a public ceremony and more like a business enterprise? The expanded use of privatized punishment 1 serves as a catalyst to rethink Durkheim's theory of criminal punishment in an era of neoliberal governance (Greenhouse 2011:181; Harcourt 2011; .
Incorporating Durkheimian and neo-Durkheimian insights, we develop three cultural trajectories through which privatized punishment may bolster or degrade social solidarity. These trajectories focus attention on the cultural meanings broadcast by privatized punishment and received by citizens. In the first trajectory, Parity in Punishment, private firms and public agencies are seen by the public as interchangeable in the practice of punishment. In this trajectory, privatization leaves the message of punishment unaltered and therefore has no deleterious effects on solidarity. In the second trajectory, Public Interest, private punishment firms are seen as acting out of a sense of greed and disregard for public welfare. In this trajectory, privatization degrades solidarity by virtue of its perceived self-interest and rapacity. In the third trajectory, Sacred
Transgressions, privatized punishment is seen as encroaching on the most sacred forms of punishment, which are imposed on criminals beyond the pale. Here, privatization debases solidarity to the extent that private actors are allowed to punish society's most vile offenders.
This article makes three contributions. First, it extends Durkheimian theorizing to explicitly consider the possibility that the identity of a punisher moderates the supposed relationship between punishment and social solidarity. Second, the article shifts our focus away from observable performance indicators to the meanings and narratives surrounding privatized punishment. In doing so, it argues for increased cultural analysis of privatized punishment, which may shed light on its potentially destabilizing consequences. Third, in explicating three cultural trajectories, it offers a guide to future empirical research on punishment, social solidarity, and the cultural narratives that link the two. The article first reviews Durkheim's major statements on punishment and the state. It then reviews neoDurkheimian scholarship on punishment, which calls attention to cultural narratives and meaning. The article then introduces the empirical case of privatized punishment in the United States, which serves to focus our theorizing of the three cultural trajectories.
DURKHEIM ON CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND STATE POWER
For Durkheim, crime and punishment are inseparable. Durkheim defined crime as an act that offends the collective consciousness--"[t]he totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society [which] forms a determinate system with a life of its own" (Durkheim [1893 (Durkheim [ ] 1997 . Crime, in offending these sentiments, "provokes against the perpetrator the characteristic reaction known as punishment" (Durkheim [1893 (Durkheim [ ] 1997 , defined by Durkheim as "a reaction of passionate feeling, graduated in intensity, which society exerts through the mediation of an organized body over those of its members who have violated certain rules of conduct" ([1893] 1997:52) .
While punishment affects the person punished, it "is above all intended to have its effects upon honest people" (Durkheim [1893 (Durkheim [ ] 1997 . When a crime offends the collective consciousness, the emotional response of punishment reaffirms the collective values and beliefs that were infringed, and, in doing so, bolsters social solidarity, which Durkheim described as "a certain number of states of consciousness [that] are common to all members of the same society" (Durkheim [1893 (Durkheim [ ] 1997 . Because crime offends deeply felt sentiments, the response must be passionate. "A mere re-establishment of the order that has been disturbed cannot suffice. We need a more violent form of satisfaction… [I] t is thanks to the intensity of its [society's] reaction that it recovers, maintaining the same level of vitality" (Durkheim [1893 (Durkheim [ ] 1997 . This emotional response to a crime is thus necessary for a well-functioning society.
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Can the state delegate authority to punish? Durkheim (1958) orders for action to be taken. They co-ordinate ideas and sentiments, from these they frame decisions and transmit these decisions to other agencies that carry them out" (Durkheim 1958:50-1) . To whom may the state delegate critical societal responsibilities?
Certainly Durkheim had in mind government agencies charged with administering regulations and carrying out mandates (see Cotterrell 1999) . But can delegation extend to private actors explicitly motivated by private gain? This is a critical question for a Durkheimian analysis of modern American punishment, in which government increasingly relies of private firms to implement punishment.
A brief aside is in order to justify our application of Durkheim's functional theory of punishment to modern day American society. In Durkheim's evolutionary view of society, affronts to society were felt more intensely and punished more severely in societies characterized by mechanical solidarity and a repressive (i.e., punitive) system of law (Cotterrell 1999; Durkheim [1893 Durkheim [ ] 1997 (Durkheim [1893 (Durkheim [ ] 1997 . This is evident in the American civil justice system, in which private parties bring suit for private harms, and in which compensatory damages are intended to make whole the injured party. Importantly for our purposes, Durkheim viewed legal evolution as a continuum, which can be seen in his roughly chronological account of the development from highly repressive to highly restitutory legal systems (e.g., Durkheim [1900 Durkheim [ ] 1969 Durkheim [ , [1893 Durkheim [ ] 1997 . By implication, it is unreasonable to believe that any society could abandon repressive law entirely for restitutory law. While Durkheim's own writing offers fertile ground for theorizing the cultural effects of punishment, it is lacking in three respects. First, it does not explicate the mechanisms that link punishment to solidarity (Smith 2013:116-118) . Second, it assumes that punishment has a positive effect on solidarity. And third, it does not theorize the importance of the punisher's identity. Neo-Durkheimian scholarship can help address the first two omissions, which then allows us to address the third.
LINKING PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL SOLIDARITY: THE IMPORTANCE OF MEANING
In Durkheim's construction, punishment is assumed to have a functional effect.
However, neo-Durkheimian scholars call attention to cases in which punishment becomes dysfunctional. They make two points. First, the cultural effect of punishment depends on the meanings, narratives, and images that are conveyed by the punishing authority and received by the citizenry. Second, the meanings of punishment may become distorted, thereby leading to dysfunction and dissatisfaction. These points have been developed most fully in Philip Smith's work (2008 Smith's work ( , 2013 . For Smith (2008) , punishment is a "ritualized effort towards the containment and elimination of pollution" (23), which restores order and reaffirms the sacred in society. In his neo-Durkheimian account, meanings of punishment emerge and change based on the interplay of sacred codes and rites of punishment, which involve the punisher (typically the state), the punished (the criminal), and civil society (the audience and repository of the collective consciousness).
The literature contains numerous examples of fluid cultural narratives surrounding forms of punishment: growing dissatisfaction with public displays of punishment (Pratt 2013; Spierenburg 1984; Smith 2008; Garland 1990 ); concerns about the scope of the state power (Willis 2008) ; and the rise and decline of particular execution methods (Smith 2008; Garland 1990 Garland , 2010 cf. Lynch 2000) . In each of these cases, popular narratives and images led to a change in the meaning of punishment. These forms of punishment, while initially deemed acceptable responses to crime, became polluted and unworkable in an evolving civil society. One aspect of modern punishment that is subject to shifting penal narratives is the delegation of punishment to private, selfinterested actors.
PRIVATIZED PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The private sector has gained increased responsibility for administering punishment in the post-sentencing phase of the American criminal justice system. In sum, private actors have gained increasing shares of the punishment market since the 1970s and 1980s. Private firms can be seen operating prisons, jails, community supervision, and immigrant detention centers. Below, we explore how Durkheimian and neo-Durkheimian ideas about punishment, meaning, and solidarity may bear on the privatization of punishment.
CULTURAL TRAJECTORIES OF PRIVATIZED PUNISHMENT
We develop three cultural trajectories that may describe the functional effects of privatized punishment. The use of 'trajectories' carries a note of uncertainty. Trajectories are predictable paths, which nonetheless allow for contingencies and changes of course.
These trajectories are cultural in the sense that privatized punishment has some effect on social solidarity via the meanings emanating from punishment. These trajectories extend
Durkheim's thesis on the function of punishment in two ways. First, they explicitly consider the identity of the punisher as a possible moderating factor in the causal chain from punishment to social solidarity, describing several ways in which punishment by private actors may (or may not) mitigate the positive societal effects of punishment.
Second, the trajectories incorporate a neo-Durkheimian emphasis on the meanings that are projected by punishment.
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We draw on the case of modern privatized punishment in the United States to develop the three trajectories: Parity in Punishment, Public Interest, and Sacred
Transgressions. The analysis below does not aim to be a test of the prevalence or salience of the trajectories. Rather, discourse and empirical patterns are used to motivate the conceptual development of the three cultural trajectories. Various secondary data sources are used to document the empirical patterns of privatization, while coverage of privatized punishment in major American newspapers serves as a source of public discourse on the issue.
Parity in Punishment
The first cultural trajectory, Parity in Punishment, claims that the identity of the punishing entity has no implications for the meanings and interpretations of criminal punishment. Prisons, in general, can be understood as places "whose evolution responds to the deep cultural imperative for order and purity" (Smith 2008:89) . In this Durkheimian understanding of prisons and punishment, the prison is part of a purification ritual for both society and prisoner. For a prison to properly perform its cultural role, the prisoner's pollution must be contained and cleansed, but in a way that preserves the sacredness of society and the individuality of the prisoner. Durkheim's own work on the division of labor motivates this trajectory. With modernization, professions became more specialized and distinct from each other.
Occupational types proliferated, creating a more heterogeneous society (Durkheim [1893] 1997:91-92). At the same time, the rise of contract law in modern society expanded the forms of relationships that can occur between two or more entities. The contract is a "regulatory force that is imposed by society and not by individuals: it is a force that becomes ever more weighty and complex" (Durkheim [1893 (Durkheim [ ] 1997 letter to the editor excoriated public prison guards in California to make a case for privatization: "the 34% increase in wages and its $500 million a year cost to taxpayers is criminal" (Wood 2003:B.18 ).
Beyond efficiency, many critics question the efficacy of the state's response to crime. Private actors have increasingly taken on criminal justice tasks (e.g., private security, target hardening, surveillance), in part because of the perceived failings of the central state and its inability to properly address the problem of crime (Carlson 2012; Garland 1996 Garland , 2001 cf. Wacquant 2010 If indeed efficiency, efficacy, and economic rationality have come to define modern punishment, then privatization may do little to disrupt the messages conveyed by criminal punishment. 8 However, if privatization does call into question the meaning of punishment, it is likely to do so according to one of two trajectories.
Public Interest
Durkheim viewed state-sponsored punishment as a reflection of society: "The power to react [to crime], which is available to the functions of government…is only an emanation of the power diffused throughout society, since it springs from it. The one power is no more than the reflection of the other" (Durkheim [1893] 1997:60). Our second trajectory, Public Interest, draws on this idea to consider the perceived correspondence between the private entity and society. While government agencies are generally assumed to act on behalf of society, the same may not be true for private punishers. We expect the meanings of privatized punishment to be enhanced to the extent that private punishers are seen as acting in the public interest. To the extent that private punishers are perceived to be acting on behalf of private investors, and not on behalf of society, we expect that privatization will degrade the image of punishment.
In political struggles, opponents attempt to characterize particular actors and institutions as violating sacred democratic codes in civil society (Alexander and Smith 1993:165; Smith 2008) . At the same time, they "shield themselves behind the discourse of democracy" in order to bolster their own claims (Alexander and Smith 1993:165) .
At the intersection of punishment and privatization, such contestation will involve attempts to brand privatized punishment as working to serve private interests rather than the public good. If privatized punishment is deemed to be a private act, then its image as a societal good may be tarnished. If private actors are perceived as being overly avaricious, unusually cruel, or sacrificing quality in the name of profit, the punishment ritual will break down as roles of punisher and punished change characterization (Smith 2008 ). For example, one 1999 letter to the editor of the Los Angeles Times stated, "Society (government) has a responsibility to both the prisoner and the public, not to stockholders of a for-profit enterprise" (Kania 1999:6) A for-profit firm can easily be characterized as acting exclusively (or primarily)
for private gain (e.g., Carlsen 2012; Hartney and Glesmann 2012). Such perceived motivations may diminish the sense that punishment is redressing harm done to society.
Not-for-profit firms could more plausibly be painted as serving the interest of society and working to redress societal harms (Armstrong 2002 "There are at least 25 foundations in the United States with assets exceeding $1 billion. Why would any one of them take up the challenge of creating a penal institution that rehabilitates prisoners? […] Because as charitable, civic-minded organizations, their duty and privilege is to promote the public good. Imagine a prison that actually returned inmates to society as better people than when they went in. Now that's a public service if ever there was one" (Moran 1997:23) .
Given the symbolically important distinction between for-profit and non-profit organizations, it is possible any salutary effects of privatized punishment are in part contingent on the business model employed.
The Public Interest trajectory allows for regional variation in perceptions of the public interest. American criminal justice is highly localized. Variable local cultures permit variable criminal justice policies (Garland 2010; Lynch 2010; Smith 2013) . In jurisdictions that are most permissive of privatized punishment, the public may simply interpret and understand private corrections firms as acting on behalf of the public.
Conversely, citizens in these jurisdictions may distrust government actors and view them as no less self-serving than private businesses (e.g., Lynch 2004:264-265) . However, in other jurisdictions (for example, those with a strong history of organized labor), citizens may perceive a bright line separating the public sector and the private sector, with the latter serving distinctly and exclusively private ends. In these cases we would expect privatization to lead to questions about the true function of punishment, as when a union representative wrote in 1994:
"The 60,000 members of AFSCME Corrections United, the men and women who work in government-run prisons […] have only one goal when they go to work: to protect the outside world from these prisoners. They always have an eye on our security, never on their profit sharing" (Puma 1994:7) .
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Sacred Transgressions
Sacred Trangressions considers the severity of a crime as a moderating factor between privatized punishment and solidarity. Privatize Executions.", the piece begins:
"The time has come to consider the privatization of executions.
There can no longer be any doubt that government --society itself --is incapable of doing anything right, and this certainly applies to the executions of convicted criminals.
At present, the thing is a total loss, to the convicted person, to his family and to society. It need not be so." (Miller 1992) Miller then proceeds to detail his sardonic vision for the events, which would occur at Shea Stadium and be preceded by a rendition of "The Star-Spangled Banner. While it may be symbolically potent for the state (or its public agencies) to punish terrorists, traitors, or mass murderers, since these have committed offenses against society, privatized punishment may be adequate for carrying out society's reaction against lower-level offenses (e.g., larceny, drug abuse, drunk driving). These crimes represent minor challenges to the sacred, and as such, may be handled by non-state actors. These gradations of severity were raised in 1986 by a California Department of Corrections representative, who defended a proposed private facility by saying, "Our intent is to house 100 extremely low-risk parolees at Artisan Oaks. They will be the kind of inmates who do not warrant adjudication through the courts. They will be returned to custody by their parole officers for minor violations for a maximum of six months." (Barker 1986:6) The example emphasizes the triviality of the offenses as a means of justifying the private detention, implicitly acknowledging that more serious offenders would not be acceptable.
13
A corollary of the Sacred Transgressions trajectory is that privatization does not detract from punishment of mundane offenses because the response is conceived as rehabilitative. Kevin Wright (2009) has argued that private prisons provide an opportunity to revive and enhance rehabilitation efforts in corrections. Such efforts, he argues, will go a long way toward increasing the legitimacy of private prisons;
"'punishment for profit' would be replaced with 'rehabilitation for profit '" (83) . Consider the case of drug abusers, whose offense is increasingly viewed as a medical or public health issue and therefore less deserving of punishment.
One manifestation of the rehabilitative stance toward such offenders is the drug court, in which offenders are (typically) ordered to complete a treatment program in lieu of incarceration (Huddleston, Marlowe, and Casebolt 2008) . While drug courts themselves operate under governmental auspices, the treatment programs are typically private (Roman, Ducharme, and Knudsen 2006) . Such treatment centers are big business.
In a recent example, private equity firm Bain Capital bought a chain of substance abuse treatment facilities (Habit OPCO, Inc.) for $58 million via its company CRC Health, the largest provider of substance abuse and behavioral health treatment in the country (Healy 2014) . A representative from CRC explained how the company managed to become a leader in responding to substance abuse: "We've pretty much convinced the country now that this is a health care issue. This isn't about bad people trying to become good. This is about ill people trying to get well" (Deni Carise quoted in Healy 2014). Such a narrative shifts the nature of the offense from criminal to medical, and thereby shifts the response from punitive to rehabilitative. To the extent that societal responses to low-level offenders are perceived as rehabilitative rather than (or perhaps as well as) punitive, privatization will not disrupt social solidarity because the response itself is not seen as punishment.
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The distinction between rehabilitation and punishment is also embodied in Illinois' statutory prohibition on privately operated prisons (one of two such bans, the other being in New York). The text of the law provides a rationale for the ban:
"The General Assembly hereby finds and declares that the management and operation of a correctional facility or institution involves functions that are inherently governmental. absence of privatized punishment of heinous offenders is precisely due to the special need for society to punish sacred transgressions. On this account, any arrangement to the contrary-privatized punishment for "the worst of the worst"-would not persist for
long. An alternative explanation would point to pragmatic concerns about safety and security as the operative factor in keeping the punishment of sacred transgressions in the hands of government. This alternative explanation would argue that private businesseswhether because of a corrupting profit motive or simply inexperience-are incapable of punishing the most serious offenders while simultaneously keeping the public safe. In effect, such an explanation represents the converse of assertions of declining state power to control crime (Carlson 2012; Garland 1996) ; private firms cannot keep us safe. These two explanations for the absence of privatized punishment of sacred transgressions need not be mutually exclusive. Citizens may be justifiably concerned about the ability of a private business to securely detain wicked offenders, while simultaneously feel intuitively that the punishment is best delivered by a public entity. Whatever the underlying justification for such concerns, this third trajectory suggests that punishment of the most heinous offenders will remain in government hands for the foreseeable future. This meaning-centric analysis of punishment is in stark contrast to dominant neoliberal discourses of punishment. The latter focus all attention on efficiencies, costs, and measurable performance (see Burkhardt 2014; Dolovich 2009; Garland 2001:188-190 ). In the context of neoliberal punishment, the punished become expenses to be minimized (Aviram 2015) or, worse, sources of revenue to be maximized (Page and Soss 2015) . This neoliberal perspective elides any deeper questions about symbols, morals, or justice, and in doing so enables non-state actors to assume the role of punisher. While elites may push this neoliberal ideology (Beckett and Sasson 2000; Hawdon and Wood 2014) , there is no guarantee that it will resonate with the public (e.g. 
CONCLUSION
ENDNOTES
1 We use the term 'privatized' punishment to indicate a contractual relationship between government and a private, non-governmental organization responsible for implementing a state-sanctioned punishment. We intentionally avoid the use of 'private' punishment, which may connote the historical process whereby punishment moved from public venues to private, unseen spaces (Smith 2008; Spierenburg 1984) .
administered the English transportation system in the 17 th century (Feeley 2002) , and private landowners and businessmen enacted the convict leasing system in 19 th century
American states (Hallett 2006) . Our concern in this section is the modern manifestation of privatized punishment in the U.S., which represents a break from a long period of government monopoly over administering punishment.
6 Unlike probation, though, private companies have been unsuccessful in taking over responsibility for supervising parolees released from prison (Lee 2012) . 7 We assume that modern American corrections is characterized partly (but not solely) by punishment. We acknowledge recent emphases on "evidence-based" practices and prisoner re-entry programming in corrections. 8 The Parity in Punishment hypothesis leaves open the possibility that the implementation of punishment-private or public-is inconsequential for solidarity, contra Durkheim. Garland (1990:71) , for example, has argued that the determination of punishment (i.e., sentencing) has become more culturally consequential than the implementation of punishment. 9 The presence of an active labor union for prison guards also allows for a countervailing narrative: unions exist to protect their professional turf and pad their members' wallets (Page 2011 10 Jails do not fit neatly into the more or less punitive spectrum. Because they must hold suspects before trial, jails must be capable of holding both high-risk and low-risk suspects. Private operation of jails has remained minimal, with roughly two percent of American jails operated by private firms (Stephan and Walsh 2011) .
11 Private firms also provide security forces in foreign interventions (Benoit 2014;
McCoy 2009). However, since such operations do not represent punishment (as used here), they fall outside the scope of this article.
12 While private individuals have served as executioners at times in American history, none has attempted to turn this into a full-fledged business venture, much less an investment opportunity. Even this claim, however, must remain tentative, as case law and statutes generally protect the identities of executioners (Roko 2007) . 13 Offense severity is conceptually distinct from public safety risk; the former is concerned with violations already committed, the latter with potential future violations.
Empirically, however, these two concepts are likely to be tightly coupled.
whether the offense was a 'crime'-that is, whether it wounded the collective consciousness and provoked a passionate, organized response (i.e., punishment). If minor offenses, like drug abuse, do not offend the collective consciousness and provoke a passionate, organized response, then they should not be considered 'crimes'. Regardless of whether these offenses are low-level 'crimes' or 'non-crimes', punishment (and its privatization) should have relatively minor effects on solidarity.
